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WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN HOMES:
ANOTHER CRISIS FOR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
I. Introduction
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects persons against "unreasonable searches and seizures."' Al-
though this protection applies to arrests as well as searches, 2 it is
not applied to both with equal force. A bifurcated standard has
developed between the requirements for searches and those for ar-
rests.' A warrantless search, including a search of a private resi-
dence, violates the fourth amendment in the absence of certain
exigent circumstances.' Exigent circumstances, when present,
would jeopardize a search or an arrest by a police officer if the officer
were required first to obtain a warrant.'
The same warrant requirement does not attach to arrests. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a warrantless public
arrest does not violate the fourth amendment.' However, the Court
has yet to decide whether a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a
private residence to effect an arrest in the absence of exigent cir-
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). "There is no doubt that by the
reference to the seizure of persons, the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to arrests."
Id. at 436-37.
3. See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
5. Cases showing circumstances where a search warrant is not required include: Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to lawful arrest); Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (searches after knowing consent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (searches during limited "stop and frisk"); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
(searches by unwitting invitation); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (searches after
hot pursuit); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970)
(certain searches of automobiles); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (searches of
abandoned property).
6. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The Court did require, however, that
the warrantless arrest be based upon probable cause. Id. at 415.
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cumstances also violates the fourth amendment. Indeed, the Court
has expressly left the issue open.7
This Comment will examine the distinction between a forcible
entry for an arrest and one for a search. In addition, it will trace,
through an analysis of Supreme Court decisions, the historical de-
velopment of warrantless entries for the purpose of arrest. Further-
more, this Comment will discuss the Court's rationale behind its
strict view on warrantless entries to search and will then suggest
application of this rationale to warrantless entries for the purpose
of arrest. Finally, this Comment will analyze contradictory deci-
sions in the state and lower federal courts and will recommend
literal compliance with the fourth amendment, subject to certain
exceptions to be considered in light of exigent circumstances.
II. Warrantless Arrests: The Standard of United States
v. Watson
The Supreme Court first held that the fourth amendment permits
a warrantless arrest in a public place absent exigent circumstances
in United States v. Watson.8 Watson involved a conviction for pos-
session of stolen mail. The defendant was arrested in a public place
without an arrest warrant.' His motion to suppress evidence seized
as a result of the arrest was denied. 0 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding, inter alia," that the arrest was a violation of the fourth
amendment because of the absence of an arrest warrant. 2
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that the
fourth amendment did not require the procurement of a warrant.
7. Id. at 418 n.6; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958).
8. 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
9. Id. at 413. The events leading up to the arrest were as follows. A reliable informant
told a postal inspector that a man named Watson was in possession of a stolen credit card
and had asked the informant to cooperate in its unlawful use. A meeting was arranged
between the informant and Watson at which time the informant was to signal the inspector
if he learned that Watson had additional stolen credit cards. The signal was given at the
meeting and Watson was arrested. Id. at 412-13.
10. Id. at 413-14. After the signal was given, the officers moved in and arrested Watson
but a search of his person revealed that he had no additional credit cards with him. An officer
asked if he could look inside Watson's car to which Watson replied, "Go ahead." The addi-
tional cards were discovered as a result of this search of the car. The Court held that the
consent, was voluntary. Id. at 425.
11. In addition to the holding that the arrest was unconstitutional, the court of appeals
held that based on the totality of the circumstances, Watson's consent to search the car was
involuntary and as such was not a valid ground to search the automobile. United States v.
Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. Id. at 852.
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The Court relied on previous Supreme Court cases, common law
and federal and state statutes."3
Reviewing the previous Supreme Court decisions,' Justice Byron
R. White, in his majority opinion, did not require a warrant to make
a valid arrest for a felony. 5 Justice White saw the common law as
permitting a peace officer to arrest for a felony even without a war-
rant where the crime was not committed in the officer's presence."
Justice White took note of the Second Congress's investment of
United States marshals and their deputies "with 'the same powers
in executing the laws of the United States, as sheriffs and their
deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws of
their respective states.' "'f According to Justice White, the common
law, authorizing warrantless felony arrests, generally prevailed in
the states. Since the Second Congress invested the federal marshals
with the same powers the common law invested in peace officers,
the Second Congress saw no inconsistency between the fourth
amendment and warrantless arrests, thereby implying that war-
rantless public arrests are lawful under the Constitution." Justice
White then reviewed the current federal statute" authorizing mar-
shals to make warrantless felony arrests and the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,20 which rec-
ommended permitting warrantless felony arrests."
13. 423 U.S. at 414-25.
14. The Court relied on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
15. 423 U.S. at 424.
16. Id. at 418. See generally Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. Rav. 541
(1924).
17. 423 U.S. at 420, quoting Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §. 9, 1 Stat. 265.
18. 423 U.S. at 420.
19. The statute provides:
United States marshals and their deputies may carry firearms and may make arrests
without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence,
or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such
felony.
18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1970).
20. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 (1975). See also text accom-
panying note 86 infra.
21. 423 U.S. at 421-22. The felony need not have been committed in the officer's presence
but there must be probable cause to support the arrest.
19781
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The opinion of the Court was attacked in both the concurring and
dissenting opinions. Justice Lewis F. Powell, in his concurring
opinion, saw the cases cited by the Court in support of its conclusion
as not squarely facing the issue." Instead, those decisions rested on
such issues as probable cause, whether the crime in question had
been committed in the officer's presence or the failure to question
the validity of the warrant in a lower court. 3
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, challenged
the Court's reliance on the common law and federal and state stat-
utes. Justice Marshall conceded that the common law authorized
warrantless felony arrests, but not warrantless misdemeanor arrests.
He maintained that the common law should not have been a basis
for the Court's decision. The common law was formulated when the
number of offenses constituting felonies was far less than the num-
ber of offenses classified as statutory felonies today." Justice Mar
shall attacked the reliance on state and federal statutes: "[lIt is
well settled that the mere existence of statutes or practice, even of
long standing, is no defense to an unconstitutional practice."2"
III. Warrantless Entry for the Purpose of Arrest
A warrantless public arrest in the absence of exigent circumstan-
ces is constitutional under United States v. Watson. The Supreme
Court has not, however, decided whether a peace officer may forci-
bly enter private premises to effect an arrest without a warrant
absent exigent circumstances. The issue was termed by Justice Har-
lan "a grave constitutional question,"" and has been addressed by
the Court in dicta and by implication.27 In the few instances where
22. Id. at 426 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
23. Id. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, however, on the basis of the historical
momentum of acceptance of warrantless arrests and the possible damaging impact of a
contrary holding on effective law enforcement. Id. at 429-32 (Powell, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 438-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The distinction is that crimes which were
misdemeanors at common law, and as such required a warrant for an arrest (unless commit-
ted in the presence of an officer), are now felonies and as such no longer require a warrant
for an arrest
25. Id. at 443. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). See generally Comment, Forcible
Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82 DICK. L. Rav.
167 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967).
[Vol. VII
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the issue has been considered by the Supreme Court, a clear indica-
tion of the outcome has not yet emerged.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,18 Justice Potter Stewart ad-
dressed this issue in 'dictum. In that case, Coolidge was suspected
of murder. He was arrested inside his residence and his car, which
was parked in the driveway, was towed to the police station. The
car was subsequently searched resulting in the introduction of in-
criminating evidence at trial." The issue was whether the fourth
amendment precluded the introduction of this evidence when the
arrest was conducted in the absence of a valid warrant.3 The Court
found the evidence inadmissible,3 'but did not rule on the warrant-
less entry issue. Instead, it relied on the absence of any exigent
circumstances which would justify a warrantless search.32
Justice Stewart could not reconcile authorizing forcible entries
into a residence without a warrant and in the absence of exigent
circumstances with the strict requirements established for searches
under the fourth amendment:3
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house
in order toarrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental
conflict with the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches
inside a man's house Without a Warrant are per se unreasonable in the ab-
sense of some one of a number of well defined exigent circumstances.
28. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
29. Id. at 447-48. The searches occurred two days after the seizure and again in the
following year. The evidence consisted of vacuum sweepings taken from the car which indi-
cated that Pamela Mason, the murdered girl, was probably in the car. Id. at.448.
30. There was a search warrant in this case but it was held invalid by the court because
it was not issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate in compliance with the fourth
amendment. The warrant here was issued by the Attorney General who was acting as justice
of the peace. Id. at 449.
31. See id. at 490.
32. Id. at 455-73. The search was not incident to a lawful arrest because it was too far
away from the place of arrest. The automobile exception did not provide a basis for the seizure
because there was no hazardous chase, contraband or people waiting to remove the evidence.
Nor could the search be justified under the plain view exception. The viewing of the evidence
must have been inadvertent for this exception to be applicable. Id. If the search had been
legitimate, the Court would have been forced to face the warrantless entry issue. See also
cases cited in note 4 supra.
33. 403 U.S. at 477-78, Justice Stewart discussed this issue in response to a dissenting
opinioA by Justice White, who believed that warrantless arrests on probable cause may be
effected in the home. Id. at 510, 511 n.1.
Justice Stewart posited that if Justice White were correct in stating that the courts had
assumed that a warrantless entry of one's house for the purpose of an arrest is constitutional
then "it might be wise to reexamine that assumption." Id. at 480.
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The decision of the Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden3 sup-
ports Justice Stewart's view regarding warrantless entries for arrest.
In Warden, the police arrested the defendant in his home without a
warrant." The Court found the warrantless entry justified by the
exigencies of the situation.30 This decision may suggest, by negative
implication, that an arrest warrant is required in the absence of
exigent circumstances.37
In these cases, the Supreme Court did not conclusively establish
its position on this issue. In other cases the contrary implication is
suggested. In Ker v. California,38 petitioner Ker was convicted of
possession of marijuana. Upon suspicion of marijuana dealings,39
police went to Ker's apartment, 0 obtained a passkey from the build-
ing manager and, without a warrant, entered the apartment. While
inside, they arrested the petitioner and seized a quantity of mari-
juana.4 The admissibility of this evidence at trial turned on whether
the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest. Before deciding
whether the search was valid, therefore, the Court was forced to rule
34. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
35. Id. at 297-98.
36. Id. at 298. The police entered the defendant's premises shortly after having been
informed that the defendant fled to a private residence after committing a robbery. Mrs.
Hayden answered the door when the police officers knocked and when asked if the officers
could search the house, she offered no objection. The Court did not reach the consent issue.
Exigent circumstances justified the entry. Id. at 297-98.
37. Such a conclusion would be consonant with the construction of Warden made by
Justice Stewart in his Coolidge opinion. See 403 U.S. at 480-81. See also Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, a suspect was being questioned at the doorstep of
his house by a police officer standing just outside. When the police officer identified himself
as such, the suspect fled into his house. The officer then followed. Noting that a police officer
should state his authority and purpose at the doorstep and be refused admittance before
breaking in, the Court found no extraordinary circumstances excusing the officer's failure to
explain his presence before forcible entry. Id. at 482-84.
38. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
39. Id. at 26-28. The police followed one Roland Murphy, a suspected marijuana seller,
to an area where an undercover policeman had previously purchased marijuana from Murphy
through a middleman. There, petitioner Ker was seen sitting in his car when Murphy ap-
proached him and appeared to have a conversation with him. The police followed Ker when
he drove away but lost sight of him. Later, the police proceeded to Ker's apartment. Other
evidence showed that Ker was previously engaged in the sale of marijuana consisting of
information given to police by informants.
40. Id. at 28. Upon arrival at the apartment building, the police ascertained that Ker's
apartment was occupied.
41. Id. at 28-29. Conflicting evidence was produced as to whether the marijuana was seen
before or after the arrest. Ker said that the arrest took place before the police saw the
marijuana. Id. at 29.
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on the lawfulness of this arrest.
The California Penal Code permitted officers to break into a resi-
dence after demanding admittance and explaining their purpose. 2
A judicial exception to the notice requirement was created by Cali-
fornia courts where certain circumstances existed." The circum-
stances which justified the entry without notice in Ker were the ease
with which the evidence could be destroyed and the danger to the
officers." The Supreme Court held, "in the particular circumstan-
ces of this case the officers' method of entry, sanctioned by the law
of California, was not unreasonable under the standards of the
Fourth Amendment. . . ."" The presence of exigent circumstances
as justifying the warrantless arrest generally was not the basis of the
Court's holding. Instead, it relied on the presence of exigent circum-
stances as justifying the exception to the notice requirement." This
holding may suggest that the warrantless entry would have been
ruled constitutional even if no exigent circumstances were present
if the officers had complied with the notice requirement.
Other cases contribute to the confusion over the Supreme Court
rulings in this area. In Johnson v. United States,"7 the constitution-
ality of a warrantless arrest in private premises was at issue.18 The
Court struck down the arrest but did so on the basis of the absence
of probable cause, 9 possibly suggesting that if probable cause had
been present, the entry would have satisfied the fourth amend-
ment."o In Miller v. United States,5 the Court held that an officer
could not break down a door to effect a non-exigent arrest without
42. To make an arrest, . . . in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door
or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which [he has]
reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and
explained the purpose for which the admittance is desired.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970).
43. 374 U.S. at 39-40 (citing People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 858 (1956)).
44. 374 U.S. at 40.
45. Id. at 40-41.
46. Id. at 39-40.
47. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
48. In Johnson, officers entered a hotel room upon detecting the smell of burning opium
and arrested the sole occupant of the hotel room. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 16-17.
50. Id. at 17, construed in Brief for Appellee at 22, United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412
(2d Cir. 1978).
51. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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an announcement of the officer's presence. Thus, an implication
may exist that given an announcement of purpose, a warrantless
arrest in a dwelling is constitutional even if achieved by forcible
entry.2
Although the Supreme Court has refrained from deciding whether
warrantless entries in order to arrest are constitutional, the ration-
ale behind the Court's decisions regarding warrantless searches is
relevant to the resolution of this problem. The reasons for prohibit-
ing entries to search without a warrant apply with equal force to
entries for the purpose of arrest without a warrant.
The aim of the fourth amendment is illustrated by the Court's
opinion in Katz v. United States. 5 In that case, the petitioner was
convicted of transmitting wagering information. Evidence was
gathered as a result of a listening device placed on a public tele-
phone which recorded Katz's conversations concerning wagering
information. The agents had not obtained a valid warrant. In
striking down this action, the Court recognized the protection of
one's reasonable expectation of privacy. The fourth amendment
protection was held to extend not to places but to people.54
Camara v. Municipal Court" involved the conviction of a "man
who refused to allow a Department of Public Health inspector to
enter his private premises because the inspector did not have a
search warrant. A warrantless entry for the purpose of inspection
was authorized by statute.5 The Court held this statute unconstitu-
tional even though a "routine inspection" of this nature involved a
"less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the
fruits and instrumentalitites of crime." 7 The Court regarded the
52. Brief for Appellee at 21, United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978). This
construction of Miller is not an obvious one. The Court expressly refrained from deciding
under what circumstances an arrest made after breaking into a dwelling might be constitu-
tional: "Whatever the circumstances under which breaking a door to arrest for felony might
be lawful, however, the breaking was unlawful where the officer failed first to state his
authority and purpose for demanding admission." 357 U.S. at 308.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. Id. at 351.52. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.... What
a person seeks to preserve as private . . . may be constitutionally protected." Justice Har-
lan, in his concurring opinion, construed this wording as meaning that one's' reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy are protected. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also notes 136 & 137 infra and accompanying text.
56. 387 U.S. at 526.
57. Id. at 531.
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individual as having a "very tangible interest in limiting the cir-
cumstances under which the sancity of his home may be broken by
official authority." 8
The Court had occasion to discuss the purpose of a search warrant
in McDonald v. United States.59 In McDonald, the petitioner was
convicted of gambling violations on the basis of evidence seized
during a warrantless search. In holding the search unconstitutional,
the Court stressed the seriousness of the privacy invasion of the
home in words that could apply with equal urgency to an entry for
the purpose of an arrest: 0
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the
home a safe, haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The
right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals .... And so
the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police
before they violate the privacy of the home.
Similarly, in Silverman v. United States,0' a case involving war-
rantless eavesdropping, the Court again affirmed the special im-
portance of the home: "The Fourth Amendment, and the personal
rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.''62
The Supreme Court cases dealing with searches indicate that the
individual's interest in the sanctity of his home is protected by the
58. Id. In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Supreme Court relied on
Camara in holding that a warrantless inspection of work areas of employment facilities
within the jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (codified in scat-
tered sections of Titles 5, 15, 18, 29, 42 & 49 of the United States Code) is unconstitutional.
See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), where the Court passed
on the validity of the Border Patrol's routine stops of vehicles at a permanent checkpoint.
In upholding the constitutionality of these stops, the Court dealt neither with "searches nor
with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Id. at 561. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
59. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
60. Id. at 455-56.
61. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
62. Id. at 511.
1978]
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fourth amendment." This interest cannot be fully protected by re-
quiring a warrant for a search but not for an arrest. The warrant
requirement should extend to both.
IV. The Development of Standards in Lower Courts
Despite the avoidance of the issue by the Supreme Court,' the
lower courts have faced the problem more directly. No uniform. rule,
however, has resulted. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, for example, addressed the issue un-
equivocally in Accarino v. United States."
In Accarino, the defendant was suspected of violating certain
gambling laws. After being placed under police observation for a
number of days," officers went to Accarino's apartment, knocked on
the door and shouted to him. When he failed to answer the door,
the officers broke it down and arrested him." The court struck down
the validity of the arrest by forcible entry." It pointed to the pres-
ence of the following circumstances showing the need for a search
warrant: adequate opportunity to procure a search warrant, the
non-violent nature of the offense, adequate opportunity to arrest
before Accarino entered his apartment and the absence of evidence
of defendant's fleeing the police.":
According to the Accarino court, breaking into a dwelling is un-
lawful unless certain exceptional circumstances exist making this
action necessary. In the court's judgment, the rules governing a
63. See notes 50-62 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In that case, the defendant
was suspected of certain narcotics offenses. Police went to Santana's residence and saw her
standing in the doorway to her house. After the police identified themselves, Santana stepped
back into the vestibule of the house where she was arrested. The Supreme Court upheld this
arrest, finding that Santana was in a public place where she had no expectation of privacy
and an arrest at this point did not violate the fourth amendment. The subsequent entry by
the police was justified by Warden. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
65. 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
66. As a result of this observation, the officers conducting the investigation saw and took
evidence of a gambling violation from Accarino's car. The evidence consisted of gambling
papers known as "numbers slips." Id. at 456-57.
67. The officers saw appellant just before he was about to enter his apartment and
shouted, "Wait a minute, police," whereupon appellant proceeded to enter his apartment.
Id. at 457. The court of appeals could not justify the warrantless entry on the basis of pursuing
a fleeing criminal because the two or three steps which appellant took after being told to stop
did not amount to a flight in this case. Id. at 464-65.
68. Id. at 465.
69. Id. at 464.
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warrantless entry for an arrest should be substantially similar to
those governing a warrantless entry for a search.'"
A similar approach was taken in Dorman v. United States7 which
concerned an armed robbery of a clothing store and several of its
customers by four men.7" The police discovered the identity and
address of one of the men," Dorman, proceeded to his residence and
entered without consent in order to arrest him." The court held the
entry lawful by creating certain exceptions to the general rule that
warrantless entries to effect an arrest are unconstitutional. 5 Judge
Leventhal emphasized that warrantless entries in order to arrest
suspects did not meet the requirements of the Constitution:"
[T]he basic principle, the constitutional safeguard that, with room for ex-
ceptions, assures citizens the privacy and security of their homes unless a
judicial officer determines that it must be overridden, is applicable not only
in case of entry to search for property, but also in case of entry in order to
arrest a suspect.
The entry here was found lawful, however, in light of the exigen-
cies of the situation. The opinion listed six considerations which are
useful in determining whether the warrant requirement may be dis-
pensed with: gravity of the offense, reasonableness of the belief that
the suspect is armed, clearness of the showing of probable cause,
reasonableness of the belief that the suspect is on the premises,
likelihood of escape and peacefulness of the entry." In addition to
these six criteria, the court considered the importance of the time
of entry, that is, whether the entry was made at night or during the
day. 5
70. See note 4 supra.
71. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
72. Id. at 387.
73. The police found copies of Dorman's probation report showing his name and address.
Id.
74. Id. at 388. The detective on the investigation was typing out an affidavit for an arrest
warrant but was told by an Assistant United States Attorney that no magistrate was avail-
able and that Dorman could be arrested without a warrant. Id. at 387-88. The subsequent
search of the home confirmed Dorman's absence but resulted in the discovery of a suit from
the clothing store. Id. at 388. Though Dorman was not arrested in the home, the entry by
the police was for the purpose of arrest, raising the issue of whether this entry to effect an
arrest was lawful.
75. Id. at 390-94.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 392-93.
78. Id. at 393. The court stated that this factor could serve to legitimize the warrantless
19781
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The Dorman criteria were adopted by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Jarvis.7 In Jarvis, FBI agents broke into defen-
dant's home and arrested him with probable cause but without a
valid warrant." Recognizing the arrest as not meeting the Dorman
standards for warrantless private arrests, the court perceived a
"serious question" as to the validity of the entry into the defen-
dant's home without a valid warrant and in the absence of exigent
circumstances." Despite the "serious question" as to the validity of
the arrest, the conviction was upheld because evidence obtained as
a result of the arrest was harmless.2
Although many circuit courts require a warrant for forcible entries
into private dwellings when exigent circumstances do not exist,83
authority to the contrary is present. The American Law Institute,
for instance, considered the question in the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure." The Model Code recommends authori-
zation of warrantless entries to effect an arrest where reasonable
cause exists,8 and in certain cases of necessity, notification and
demand for entry should not be required. 8 Moreover, the statutes
of many states, including New York, permit warrantless entries for
the purpose of arrest," and some state decisions have assumed the
entry or to strike it down. On one hand, the lateness of the hour may make it more impractical
to obtain a warrant-tending to legitimize the entry, but on the other hand, the lateness of
the hour may' raise "particular concern over its reasonableness." Id.
79. 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1977). Other circuits have adopted the Dorman criteria. See
Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phillips,
497 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974);
Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1970).
80. 560 F.2d at 496. Jarvis was suspected of bank robbery. A warrant for the arrest was
issued but was ruled invalid as not sufficiently particularized. Id. at 496-97.
81. Id. at 498. The court originally used the term "holding" when speaking of the arrest
without a warrant, but that terminology was deleted and the "serious question" wording was
used instead. See Brief for Appellee at 20, United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. 560 F.2d at 499. Palm prints and a photo which were taken from within the dwelling
would have been obtained when Jarvis came outside. Id. at 498.
83. See note 81 supra.
84. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6 (1975).
85. Id. §§ 120.1, 120.6.
86. Id. § 120.6(2).
87. Section 140.15 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law provides, in pertinent part:
4. In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which he
reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances and in
the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of subdivisions four and
five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant
of arrest.
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validity of these statutes.8
Common law antecedents supporting the lawfulness of warrant-
less arrests in private dwellings are 'reviewed in Commonwealth v.
Phelps.80 In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, citing several common law authorities, 0 was convinced that
if an officer had the right to arrest without a warrant on probable
cause, he had the right to break open doors."
While the common law applying to warrantless public arrests was
settled, 2 that applying to warrantless arrests in a dwelling was not.
In Accarino, Judge E. Barrett Prettyman considered the common
law authorities cited in Phelps.'3 In Judge Prettyman's opinion, the
common law authorities do not authorize warrantless entries for the
purpose of arrest. Judge Prettyman maintained that according to
the common law, warrantless entries to effect an arrest are lawful
N.Y. CrIM. PROC. LAW § 140.15 (McKinney 1971).
Subdivisions four and five of section 120.80 provide:
4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances and in
a manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he reasonably
believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give, or make reasona-
ble.effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant thereof, unless
there is reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such notice will:
(a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or
(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or
(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or Secretion of material evidence.
5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his autho-
rity and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter such
premises, and by a breaking if necessary.
Id. § 120.80.
For a listing of other states' statutes, see Comment, Watson and Ramey: The Balance of
Interests in Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DmGo L. Rav. 838, 847-48 n.70 (1976).
88. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), probable
jurisdiction noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec 11. 1978) (Nos. 78-5420, 78-5421); People v.
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich. 551,
198 N.W.2d 297 (1972); contra, People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341,
127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1976) ("warrantless arrests within the home are per se unreasonable
in the absence of exigent circumstances"); cf. State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn. Supp.
531, 542, 375 A.2d 417, 423 (Super. Ct. 1977) ("even if we were to follow the view that a
warrant must be obtained before forcibly entering a dwelling in order to make an arrest, the
circumstances of this case would fall within the 'exigent circumstances' exception to that
rule.")
89. 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911).
90. E.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *292; 1 HALE's PLEAS OP THE CROWN 588; 2
HALE's PLEAS OF THE CROWN 94; Semayne's case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
91. 209 Mass. at 407-08, 95 N.E. at 873.
92. See note 16 supra.
93. Judge Prettyman's opinion was cited favorably in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 306 (1958).
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only if circumstances exist making this action necessary."
The approach taken by the circuit courts on the issue of warrant-
less entries to arrest, as shown by Accarino, Dorman and Jarvis,
represents a well-reasoned manner in which to deal with the prob-
lem. The important interest of the individual in the privacy of his
home is recognized while the governmental interest in the apprehen-
sion of criminals is adequately met by the creation of certain instan-
ces where a warrant is not required.
V. Recent Decisions: Payton and Reed
The state of the law regarding entry into a private dwelling for the
purpose of arrest is confused. With the contradicting decisions of
state and federal courts, the lawfulness of an entry for the purpose
of an arrest may be determined not solely by the actions of the peace
officers but also by the source of their authority, that is, whether
they are federal or state officers. As the next section will illustrate,
a local police officer in New York State is permitted to enter a home
without a warrant to arrest while a federal agent is not allowed to
take such action unless exigent circumstances are present." The two
decisions producing this anomolous result are People v. Payton"
and United States v. Reed,'7 the former decided by the New York
Court of Appeals and the latter by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In Payton, the New York Court of Appeals, in a four to three
decision, stated: 8
94. 179 F.2d at 463. For example, Blackstone said that in the case of certain felonies, a
constable may arrest the felon upon probable cause "and for that purpose is authorized (as
upon a justice's warrant) to break open doors, and even to kill the felon if he cannot otherwise
be taken." Id. at 461-62 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292). After quoting
this passage, Judge Prettyman said that although Blackstone did not mention necessitous
circumstances in joining the breaking of the door and the killing of the felon, he did contem-
plate the existence of these circumstances. 179 F.2d at 462.
Reliance on the common law as justifying warrantless entries for the purpose of arrest is
also subject to the same attack as Justice Marshall made against warrantless arrests in
general in Watson See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
95. The federal courts' decisions would presumably be applicable to federal agents and
the state courts' decisions would be applicable to state and local officers. But unless there is
a federal statute dealing with the warrantless entries, state law governs even in cases in
federal courts. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
96. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), probable
jurisdiction noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978) (Nos. 78-5420, 78-5421).
97. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
98. 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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[An entry made for the purpose of effecting a felony arrest within the home
of the person to be arrested by a police officer who has entered without
permission of the owner, if based on probable cause, is not necessarily viola-
tive of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures even though the arresting officer has not obtained a warrant and
there are no exigent circumstances.
* In a similar case decided three months before Payton, the Second
Circuit reached a different result: "warrantless felony arrests by
federalbagents effected in a suspect's home, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, even when based upon statutory authority and prob-
able cause, are unconstitutional. '" 99
The New York State decision covered the consolidated appeals of
two cases, People v. Payton and People v. Riddick. In Payton, the
defendant was convicted of felony murder in connection with an
armed robbery of a service station. His name and address were given
to the police by two witnesses to the crime who knew Payton.' °° The
police went to his home, and, noticing that a light was on and a
radio playing, they knocked on the door. When the door was not
answered, other officers were summoned to aid in breaking it open.
Upon their arrival, the door was forced open and the officers en-
tered. 1 1 A search of the apartment revealed Payton's absence, but
in the course of this search, the police seized a shell casing found
on top of a stereo set.'0 ' This shell casing was introduced as evidence
99. 572 F.2d at 418.
100. 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
101. Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
102. Id. at 305; 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397. After seizing the shell casing, the
police conducted a "full scale" search of the apartment which resulted in the seizure of a
shotgun with ammunition, a sales receipt for a rifle and photographs of Payton with a ski-
mask. All of these articles were suppressed following a pretrial suppression hearing but the
court allowed the introduction of the shell casing, justifying the seizure under the "plain
view" exception to the search warrant requirement. That is, if the officers have a right to be
where they are, then they may seize evidence of a crime which is in plain view. See cases
cited in note 145 infra.
103. 45 N.Y.2d at 306, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
The Code of Criminal Procedure was in effect at the time of this entry. Those sections
dealing with warrantless arrest entries provided:
§ 177. In what cases allowed.
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person,
1. For an offense, committed or attempted in his presence, or where a police officer
.... has reasonable grounds for believing that an offense is being committed in his
presence;
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence;
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at trial. The defendant attacked the introduction of this evidence
on the ground that the police had no authority to be in the apart-
ment because the warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest was
unlawful. 03
Riddick involved slightly different facts but the same issue. The
victims of two armed robberies identified Riddick as the perpetrator
of those robberies."' At a later date, the police went to the defen-
dant's home to arrest him. After ascertaining Riddick's presence,
they knocked on the door, which was opened by Riddick's three year
old son. 05 Seeing Riddick sitting on a bed, the police entered and
arrested him.'"1 Because the defendant had to dress, the officer
searched the bed, a nearby chest of drawers and the defendant's
clothing. The officer seized a quantity of narcotics and a hypod-
ermic syringe.'01 Riddick's motion to suppress this evidence was
based in part on the contention that warrantless entry for the pur-
pose of making an arrest was unlawful.' 8 Payton's and Riddick's
motions were denied, and both were convicted.
The court of appeals affirmed the convictions upholding the va-
3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person to be arrested to have committed it;
4. When he has reasonable cause for believing that a felony has been committed,
and that the person arrested has committed it, though it should afterward appear that
no felony has been committed, or, if committed, that the person arrested did not
commit it;
5. When he has reasonable cause for believing that a person has been legally
arrested by a citizen ....
§ 178. May break open a door or window, if admittance refused.
To make an arrest, as provided in the last section, the officer may break open an
outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose,
he be refused admittance.
104. 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
105. Id. at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The defendant's parole officer,
who accompanied the police to Riddick's home, went into the defendant's home firit and
when he learned that Riddick was present, signalled the other officers, indicating Riddick's
presence.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The suppression court found that the evidence was lawfully seized because the
search came under the "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception to the search warrant
requirement. The defendant's specific contentions, that the arrest was unlawful because it
was effected without a warrant and without an announcement by the police of their purpose
before they entered, were not addressed by the suppression court. Id. at 308, 380 N.E.2d at
227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. For the statute dealing with warrantless arrest entries, see note 87
supra.
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lidity of warrantless entries and arrests. The court relied on the
"substantial difference" between the intrusion associated with a
search and that associated with an arrest, and the "significant dif-
ference" in the governmental interest in the two types of entries. 109
In the court's view, a search involves "a possibly thorough rum-
maging through possessions" and disclosure of articles which the
victim of the search would "expect to be free from scrutiny by unin-
vited eyes." But in the case of an entry for the purpose of arrest,
"there is no* accompanying prying into the area of expected privacy
attending [the victim's] possessions and affairs.""' 9 In addition, the
court saw the risk associated with the warrant requirement for a
search-the failure to recover evidence-as less important than the
risk associated with a warrant requirement for an arrest, namely,
the failure to apprehend criminals."' The court also relied on the
common law,"2 the relevant statutes, both in New York and other
jurisdictions and the Model Code which authorizes warrantless
entries to arrest.13
The three dissenting judges wrote separate opinions. Judge Lawr-
ence H. Cooke vigorously disagreed with the distinction drawn by
the majority between entries to arrest and entries to search."' Re-
garding the initial entry into one's home as the intrusion with which
the fourth amendment is concerned, Judge Cooke said,
"[rjeasoning that the intrusion which attends entry into the home
to effect a warrantless arrest is somehow less egregious than entry
to conduct a search, the majority simply reads the warrant require-
109. 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
110. Id. at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
111. Id. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
112. See notes 16, 24 & 94 supra.
113. 45 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 380 N.E.2d at 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01. In the Payton
case, one of the suppressed items which was seized in the full-scale search was a sales receipt
for a rifle from a sporting goods shop in Peekskill, N.Y. See note 102 supra. The owner of
this store was called as a witness in Payton's trial. Payton claimed that the testimony of this
witness was "tainted fruit" of the unlawful search, but the court disagreed, holding that the
testimony was admissible under the "inevitable disovery" doctrine. 45 N.Y.2d at 306, 313,
380 N.E.2d at 226, 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397, 402.
In Riddick, one of the contentions of the defendant was that the entry by the police did
not meet the requirements of the statute (see note 87 supra) because the police did not give
notice of their authority and purpose before their entry. The court dismissed this contention
saying that the purpose of that part of the statute, that is, "providing the person within an
opportunity to respond to the demand for admittance," was accomplished. Id. at 314-15, 380
N.E.2d at 234, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03.
114. Id. at 319, 380 N.E.2d at 234, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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ment out of the Fourth Amendment.""' To Judge Cooke, the inter-
est of the individual is equal in both an entry to effect an arrest and
an entry to search the premises. As to the governmental interest in
entering premises to arrest, Judge Cooke stressed that the warrant
requirement would be dispensed with in the presence of exigent
circumstances."' He also addressed the majority's reliance on the
common law and on statutes which authorize warrantless entries
by urging that neither "antiquity" nor "legislative unanimity"
should displace an analysis based upon reason." 7 Both Judge
Wachtler and Judge Fuchsberg concurred in these views." 8
In United States v. Reed,"' a case involving the same issue as
Payton, the Second Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion. Ap-
pellants Nancy Reed and Morris Goldsmith were both convicted of
distributing heroin and conspiracy to distribute heroin.'
2
Upon suspicion of these violations, appellants Reed and Gold-
smith were arrested at Reed's apartment. While inside the apart-
ment, an agent seized a telephone and address book later used as
evidence at the trial."' The introduction of this evidence was at-
115. Id. at 321, 380 N.E.2d at 236, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 321-23, 380 N.E.2d at 236-37, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 324, 380 N.E.2d at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 318, 380 N.E.2d at 234, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting);
id. at 315, 380 N.E.2d at 232, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler
thought that the warrantless entry in Riddick was unconstitutional but that the one in Payton
was constitutional because there were exigent circumstances. He reached substantially the
same result as Judge Cooke, however, because he would not have upheld the admissibility of
the gun receipt which was allowed by the majority under the inevitable discovery rule. Id.
(Wachtler, J., dissenting).
119. 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
120. Id. at 414. Much of the evidence introduced by the government was testimony of
Dwight Hammonds, a federal undercover agent who had been buying heroin from the appel-
lants. Id. at 415.
121. Id. There was contradictory evidence as to events surrounding the entry of the apart-
ment by the agents and the seizure of the telephone and address book. One agent testified
that he knocked on the door and after Ms. Reed opened the door, the agents told her that
they were arresting her and Goldsmith. Reed said that her daughter approached the door first,
and thereafter Reed opened the door and the agents rushed in. The district court found that
Reed was arrested when she opened the door. Id. at 415-16.
As to the seizure of the address book, the agent indicated that the seizure was after Reed
was read her rights whereas Reed said that the seizure occurred before the rights were read.
Id. at 416.
The Government first'argued that the arrest had taken place in a public place under United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), and as such was justified under Watson. 572 F.2d at
419-20. See note 8 supra. The court held that no matter which version of the entry was correct,
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tacked by the appellants who contested the lawfulness of the entry
to arrest.
After determining that the arest in Reed took place in a private
place,' the court addressed the principal question of whether a
nonconsensual entry into private premises without a warrant to
effect an arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances complies
with the fourth amendment. Following the lead of Jarvis, the court
held that it does not. 23
The fourth amendment was viewed as protecting citizens' reason-
able expectations of privacy and prohibiting unreasonable physical
entry of the home. 24 Citing numerous Supreme Court cases in sup-
port of this proposition,2 5 the court concluded that an arrest inside
the home contravenes this reasonable expectation of privacy:'2
To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all
arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home.- This is simply too
substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence
the arrest was made in a place protected by the fourth amendment. 572 F.2d at 422-23. For
the facts of Santana, see note 64 supra.
Drug Enforcement Agents were authorized to arrest without a warrant under 21 U.S.C. §
878 (Supp. V 1975), which provides:
§ 878. Powers of enforcement personnel.
Any officer or employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug designated
by the Attorney General may-
(3) make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the United States
commited in his presence, or (B) for any felony, cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing a felony ...
Id.
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was abolished in 1973 and replaced by the
Drug Enforcement Administration. See 21 U.S.C. § 878 (Supp. V 1975).
Similar federal statutes authorize warrantless arrests by other federal officers: 18 U.S.C.
§ 3052 (1976) (FBI agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1976) (United States marshals); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3056 (1976) (Secret Service agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1976) (Postal Service inspec-
tors); 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1970) (Customs agents).
122. See notes 64 & 121 supra.
123. 572 F.2d at 422-23. The court noted that the Second Circuit had not decided this
issue, as the "precise issue presented by this case has been avoided, reserved or referred to
in dictum, or has been considered in circumstances involving consent or exigent circum-
stances, or has not been raised by the parties." Id. at 420 n.7.
124. Id. at 422.
125. See id., wherein the court cited United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
126. 572 F.2d at 423.
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of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory au-
thority and when probable cause is clearly present.
The court did not consider in depth the governmental interest in
effecting warrantless entries for the purpose of arrest. It did, how-
ever, adopt the Dorman test to determine whether the warrant re-
quirement should be dispensed with in any given case.'"
The court found the arrest unlawful, rendering the telephone and
address book inadmissable as evidence. " ' Reed's conviction was re-
versed and the case was remanded for a new trial. "
An examination of Payton reveals that the court's reasoning used
in arriving at its conclusion is questionable.3" The court relied on
both the difference in the degree of intrusion and the extent of
governmental interest between searches and arrests. The court
viewed the instrusion associated with an entry for arrest as
"minimal.""' In its consideration of this issue, the court focused on
the "rummaging through possessions" as the intrusion to be
guarded against. A search was seen as a great intrusion into an
individual's life with the "upheaval of the owner's chosen or random
placement of goods,"' 3 whereas an arrest involves no such upheaval.
The court may have been correct in saying that a search entails
more of a physical "upheaval" than an arrest but surely one re-
ceives more constitutional protection in his home than on the
street.'3 In analyzing this issue, the court of appeals unduly mini-
mizes the importance of the basic protection of the fourth amend-
ment, which is privacy.' 3' Although an individual's possessions are
interfered with more during a search than in an arrest,' 31 this inter-
127. Id. at 424. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
128. 572 F.2d at 425.
129. Id. at 427. The court found that the introduction of the telephone and address book
was not a harmless error. Id. at 425. The telephone and address book was only applicable to
Reed's conviction. Goldsmith argued that the statements he made to the Assistant United
States Attorney after his arrest were involuntary, a prior conviction should not have been
allowed to be used to impeach him, and the district court's charge with respect to the
voluntariness of his statements were improper. The court rejected all three of these conten-
tions. Id. at 425-26.
130. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
131. 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 299, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
132. Id.
133. An arrest on a public street is valid without a warrant as long as probable cause
exists. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 52-62 supra and accompanying text.
135. But see notes 143-45 infra and accompanying text.
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ference takes place after the initial intrusion, the entry into the
home. This entry invades the privacy protected by the fourth
amendment. The physical invasion of the home is the "chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." ''
As Justice Jackson pointed out, "[t]he right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is . . . of grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance."'' 13 The most harmful in-
trusion restrained by the fourth amendment, the invasion of the
home, is the same in both an entry to search and an entry to arrest.
This was recognized by the Second Circuit in Reed. :3
The Payton court weighed the governmental interest in warrant-
less entries to arrest with the individual interest of privacy and
sound the interest of the former more important. The community's
interest in the apprehension of criminal suspects "is of a higher
order than is its concern for the recovery of contraband or evidence;
normally the hazards created by the failure to apprehend far exceed
the risks which may follow non-recovery.' 3 This approach assumes
that a warrant requirement for an arrest inside a home would neces-
sarily result in the failure to apprehend criminals. It disregards'what
courts imposing a warrant requirement have accepted: 4 ° the pres-
ence of exigent circumstances-one of which is the likelihood of
escape' "-would render a warrantless entry lawful. It is not clear,
therefore, that the government's interest in apprehending criminals
is substantially effected by a warrant requirement for an entry to
arrest.
The court in Payton also placed some reliance on a Model Code
commentary, stating in part, "it is far from clear that an arrest in
136. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
137. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
138. " 'The right of police officers to enter into a home, for whatever purpose, represents
a serious governmental intrusion into one's privacy. It was just this sort of intrusion that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to circumscribe by the general requirement of a judicial
determination of probable cause.'" 572 F.2d at 422 (quoting Commonwealth v. Forde, 367
Mass. 798, 805, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975)). The court also quoted Dorman " 'Freedom from
intrusion into the home ordinarily is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment.'" 572 F.2d at 422. See also text accompanying note 115 supra.
139. 45 N.Y.2d at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
140. E.g., Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); Dorman, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Accarino, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
141. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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one's home is so much more threatening or humiliating than a street
arrest as to justify further restrictions on the police."'' This reliance
is misplaced. The fourth amendment does not protect against hu-
miliation; it protects the privacy of a person's home. Privacy is not
invaded by a street arrest but is by an arrest in a private place.
As important as the individual's interest in the privacy of his
home is, it is not the only interest affected by the failure to extend
the warrant requirement to entries for the purpose of arrest. The
"plain view" and "search incident to an arrest" exceptions to the
search warrant requirement point out a probable intrusion into the
individual's personal effects as well.
Under the "search incident to an arrest" exception to the search
warrant requirement, an officer may search, upon a lawful arrest,
not only the arrested person but also "the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."'"
An example of the extent of a search incident to a lawful arrest is
shown by Riddick, where police lawfully searched a chest of drawers
in the petitioner's bedroom."' If a warrant is not required to enter a
home for an arrest, an officer may gain entry to a private home,
arrest an individual and search the surrounding area when no war-
rant has issued and no exigent circumstances exist.
Under the plain view doctrine, "objects falling in the plain view
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.""' De-
spite the limited extent of this exception, the possibility of serious
infringement on one's personal life exists,'"1 especially since the sei-
zure results from the police officer's subjective notion of probable
cause to arrest.
142. 45 N.Y.2d at 312, 380 N.E.2d at 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
143. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). This case limited the permissible
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. Previous cases had allowed more extensive
searches. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950).
144. 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397-98.
145. Harris v. United States 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); see also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Not only must the officer have a right to be where he is, but the
observance of the object must be inadvertant. Id. at 466. See also United States v. Beren-
guer, 562 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Martin, 560 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d
139 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
146. See Comment, Watson and Ramey: The Balance of Interests in Non-Exigent Felony
Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 838, 858 (1976).
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VI. Conclusion
Warrantless public arrests on probable cause were authorized by
the Supreme Court in Watson. 47 The reason lies in the balance
between governmental interest in apprehending criminals and indi-
vidual privacy interest while in public. The scale is tipped in favor
of the government. Arrests inside a suspect's home involve a much
weightier individual interest: the legitimate fourth amendment in-
terest in the sanctity of one's home. The considerations enunciated
in Dorman and accepted by Reed'48 would allow a warrantless entry
for the purpose of arrest whenever necessity exists. 4 ' However, the
same considerations would also recognize that the governmental
interest in warrantless entries to effect arrests is, in other cases, less
than the constitutionally protected individual interest in the sanct-
ity of the home. The scale would be correctly tipped in favor of the
individual.
The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue, leaving this area
of law undefined.'15 The Supreme Court cases construing the search
and seizure clause of the fourth amendment show that the purpose
of requiring a warrant for non-exigent searches is to protect the
privacy of one's home. An entry to arrest violates this privacy to the
same extent as does an entry to search. Under the fourth amend-
ment, the interest of the individual in both situations is the same.
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Payton should be
reversed. The fourth amendment necessitates a warrant for entry
into a home for the purpose of arrest, subject to the exceptions laid
down in Dorman.
Darren O'Connor
147. See notes 8-21 supra.
148. See notes 77 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
149. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra.
150. See note 7 supra.
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